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concurrent rise in drug-related ER episodes is due to the rise in the standard deviation of 
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in standard deviations at the time of the ADAA transl te to increases in cocaine and 
heroin ER mentions of 15% each. Because these negativ  outcomes depend only on the 
standard deviation of purity, this suggests that drug users respond rationally by reducing 
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Finally, again using the STRIDE data, I find that the ADAA is associated with an 
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 Although drug use has long been viewed as a problem, worries continue to mount 
as the potency of many illicit substances rise. As the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
warns, marijuana today is far more potent than that of thirty years ago and "the more 
THC [the psychoactive chemical in marijuana], the more potent and dangerous the 
"weed" is".1 As shown in Figure 1, comparable changes have occurred in the average 
purity of street-level cocaine and heroin. Concurrent with this rise in purity, the number 
of emergency room (ER) visits mentioning these drugs have has increased as well. As 
illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, the number of ER visits per 100,000 mentioning cocaine or 
heroin doubled during the 1990s. This suggests that there may be a causal link in which 
more powerful drugs increase the likelihood of accidental overdose.2 This link, however, 
poses a problem. Presuming that an overdose is an unintended consequence of use, why 
do drug users not reduce the quantity consumed as average purity rises? If users do not 
respond to anticipated changes in drug purity, this calls into question the appropriateness 
of using economic models that assume that users are rational. 
 In response to this concern, this paper does threeings. First, it demonstrates that 
a large part of the increase in cocaine and heroin purity is due to the 1986 passage of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA). This law introduced fedral mandatory minimum (MM) 
sentences based on the quantity of drugs seized, regardl ss of their purity. Second, it asks 
whether there is indeed a significant link between increasing purity and increasing ER 
visits. I find that the increase in ER visits resulted from increases in the standard 
deviation of purity rather than the increases in aver ge purity. This suggests that, 
                                                
1 Taken from DEA (2005), http://www.dea.gov/pubs/straight/mari.htm. 
2 Examples of such claims include DEA (2005) and Hall and Darke (1997). 
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consistent with standard economic assumptions, drug users do indeed respond to 
anticipated changes in purity but are unable to fully avoid the problems caused by 
increased uncertainty over purity. Third, I show that the ADAA increased the standard 
deviation of cocaine purity and therefore may have increased cocaine ER mentions. For 
heroin, federal MMs appear to have had no significant effect. 
 According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, in 2003 the U.S. federal 
government spent over $19 billion on the war on drugs. This is in addition to the billions 
spent by local law enforcement and the criminal justice system. An increasingly 
important component of these costs is the need to house offenders. Currently, over one 
million people are incarcerated in the U.S. due to drug offences (DOJ, 2004). This large 
number is due to both increased interdiction efforts and stiffer penalties for convicted 
offenders. One of the most important penalty increases for drug trafficking was the 1986 
passage of the ADAA which, among other provisions, i troduced federal MMs for drug 
trafficking.3 These MMs set forth penalties that the federal judge must impose upon 
conviction.4 The data suggest that penalties have indeed risen.Trial defendants facing 
MMs are two and a half times likely to be convicted (Jaffe, 1995).5 Furthermore, between 
1986 and 1991 the average federal prison sentence for a drug offense rose from 62 to 86 
months with the percentage of time served increasing by thirteen percent (BJS, 1995). As 
                                                
3 These laws took effect in 1987 and include the United States Code Section 21 Subsections 841, 844, and 
960, which govern the manufacture, distribution, possession, and import/export penalties for controlled 
substances. For details and discussion of this Act, see Saphos, et. al. (1987). According to Lay (2004), a 
recently-passed Senate measure seeks to increase thse sentences, including a mandatory life sentence for 
second-time offenders. In addition to federal mandatory minimums, many states have similar schemes that 
apply to cases tried in their own courts. One of the best known, the so-called Rockefeller Drug Laws, ere 
enacted in New York in 1973. 
4 These laws do allow for two exceptions. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
allows non-violent first time offenders to receive reduced sentences (BJS, 2001). In addition, those offering 
"substantial assistance" to law enforcement can obtain reduced sentences. According to the BJS (2001), this 
accounted for about 28% of cases in 1999. 
5 During 1999, 62% of drug convictions were under mandatory minimums with over half receiving 
sentences of more than sixty months (BJS, 2001). 
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Table 1 shows, the severity of the MM is increasing in the amount of the illicit drug that 
is involved in the conviction. What is surprising, however, is that the sentence is based on 
the total weight of what is captured, not on the "pure" weight, that is, the amount of the 
drug that is left after netting out adulterating sub tances.  
According to the federal MMs, someone convicted of selling five kilos of ten 
percent pure cocaine would receive a minimum of ten years in jail but someone convicted 
of selling four kilos of 100 percent pure cocaine would only a receive a five year 
sentence.6 One example of these laws in practice is the case of Prem Atri, who was 
convicted of trafficking LSD in 1989 (Nichols, 1999).  Although he was only found in 
possession of 3.3 grams of actual LSD, it was combined with 433.6 grams of blotter 
paper.  This combined weight carried a mandatory mini um sentence of ten years, while 
if the LSD had been in liquid form, it would have only warranted a five year sentence.  
By enforcing minimum sentences based upon the total weight of a mixture containing an 
illegal substance rather than on the amount of the substance alone, this increases the cost 
of delivering a given quantity of drugs. The predicted response to this is clear: to avoid 
harsher penalties and higher costs, both consumers and producers would prefer to trade in 
smaller, purer amounts. The United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime 
Prevention (1999) finds that drug traffickers do indeed respond to market changes, 
including increases in their perceived risk suggesting that such an effect may well exist.  
 This paper demonstrates such a change in response to MMs using 1977 to 2001 
data from the DEA's System to Retrieve Information fr m Drug Evidence (STRIDE) 
database. This dataset contains information on drug a rests by the Federal Bureau of 
                                                
6 Furthermore, 500 grams of pure powder cocaine yields a sentence only 1/20th of what an equal amount of 
crack cocaine (which by definition cannot be pure) would earn. 
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Investigation (FBI) and the DEA, including the purity of the seizure. As Figure 1 
illustrates for observations involving one gram or less, the purities of both cocaine and 
heroin have been rising over the past twenty-five years, with a remarkable change in the 
trend following the imposition of MMs in 1987. After controlling for a number of factors, 
these data suggest that the imposition of MMs increased the purity of cocaine by 
approximately 25.8 percentage points, an increase of about 42 percent. Similarly, the data 
suggests that MMs increased heroin purity by 8.6 percentage points, an increase of 
around 30 percent. It is notable that these increases were not mirrored in other countries. 
Using the STRIDE's international observations, I donot find an increase in the purity of 
cocaine or heroin purchased outside the U.S. after the MMs took effect. Similarly, Pianca 
(1998) found that the average purity of heroin seized in the Australian Capital Territory 
between 1980 and 1992 stayed steady at approximately 20 percent. According to the 
STRIDE data, during the same period heroin seizures in the U.S. rose in purity from 11.7 
percent to 43 percent. It is also worth noting that, although I do not analyze other drugs 
due to data availability, anecdotal evidence suggests that a comparable effect would be 
found. For example, the average THC content of marijuana (the psychoactive substance 
in the drug) rose from one percent in the mid-1970s to six percent in 2002 (ONDCP, 
2004).7 Similarly, Miron and Zwiebel (1991) document a comparable shift from beer and 
wine towards spirits during America's alcohol prohibition. 
 An important aspect of this increase is that it varies by state. In particular, as 
Table 2 details, several states had imposed their own state-level MMs prior to the federal 
law. As such, one might expect that the increase in purity in response to the federal law 
                                                
7 It should be noted that the factors affecting cocaine nd heroin purity differ from those affecting 
marijuana purity. 
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would be smaller in these states because dealers may have already shifted towards higher 
purities in response to the state-level MM. Table 3 r ports the average purity for drug 
deals of one gram or less both before and after 1987 as well as depending on whether the 
state had its own MM. As can be seen (and as is confirmed in the regression analysis), 
this increase is indeed smaller for states with their own pre-existing MMs. This 
difference-in-differences approach helps to alleviate the concern that the regression 
analysis is merely capturing a trend in the overall d ta since this would require that the 
break in the trend differed by state. Furthermore, for the estimated impact to solely reflect 
changes such as the introduction of crack or a change in the type of dealers the DEA 
targets, this too would have to be demarcated along state-level MM lines. 
 One obvious impact of MMs is that they necessitate housing offenders for longer 
periods. In addition, because of their impact on purity, MMs can lead to other unintended 
costs. First, more pure heroin can be ingested nasally or through smoking. This increases 
the attractiveness of the drug for those who are unwilli g to inject it intravenously. As a 
result, as the DEA notes, higher purity levels seem to be associated with more heroin 
users (DEA, 1999). In addition to its impact on the number of users, increased purity may 
well affect the outcome of use. Looking at data from the Drug Abuse Warning Network 
(DAWN), the number of ER episodes mentioning the us of cocaine or heroin have risen 
along with the average purity. Hall and Darke (1997) suggest that the increase in heroin 
overdoses in Australia during the mid-1990s was linked to the increase in purity. 
However, if users are rational, one would expect them to condition the quantity they 
consume on the anticipated purity of the drug in their possession. This is because as 
average purity rises, a user can consume a smaller quantity and achieve the desired high 
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without increasing their anticipated risk of overdose.8 As such, if there is indeed a 
significant correlation between average purity and overdoses, this casts doubt on the 
appropriateness of modeling drug users as rational economic agents. It is therefore 
important to determine whether there is indeed a significant link between average purity 
and overdoses.   
I find that average purity does not appear to be roustly correlated with hospital 
mentions. Instead, for both cocaine and heroin, I find that the concurrent rise in the 
standard deviation of purity appears to be behind the rise in ER mentions. Given my 
estimates, I find that the increase in the standard eviation of cocaine and heroin between 
1986 and 1987 would be associated with an estimated increase in emergency room (ER) 
mentions for cocaine and heroin of 772 and 377 per 100,000 respectively. Compared to 
the sample means, these correspond to increases of 15 percent and 15.4 percent 
respectively. Furthermore, I find that an increase in the standard deviation of one drug is 
positively correlated to ER mentions attributed to the other drug, suggesting that 
uncertainty regarding one drug creates substitution towards the other.  
Using another, heretofore unused database provided by the DAWN, I find that the 
standard deviation of purity is also positively correlated with the number of overdoses 
and unexpected reactions from heroin and cocaine use. I furthermore find that number of 
deaths from cocaine use is positively correlated with the standard deviation of cocaine 
purity. This is not found for heroin. This is consistent with the fact that with repeated use 
the body becomes more sensitive to the deadly effects of cocaine, an effect that does not 
                                                
8 Furthermore, if one were to attribute the rise in ER visits to an increased proportion of adulterants, then 
one would expect overdoses to fall as purities rise.
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occur with opiates such as heroin. Thus, the importance of purity uncertainty is likely to 
be small for this particular outcome from heroin use. 
These results beg the question of whether the increase in standard deviations can 
be attributed to the introduction of MMs. As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, using the 
STRIDE data, I find that the standard deviation of purity did indeed rise following the 
ADAA. There are certainly reasons to think that this relationship may be causal because 
of heterogeneous producer responses engendered by the law. Since MMs are twice as 
large for repeat offenders, these offenders have mor  of an incentive to increase purity 
and reduce quantity. Furthermore, different drug dealers may respond differently because 
of their ability to provide useful information to the government (thereby reducing their 
sentence). Other potential causes of heterogeneous dealer responses include variation in 
access to quality legal council and familiarity with the structure of trafficking penalties. 
Finally, since the incentive to economize on quantity is greater for larger quantities, the 
ADAA may have shifted the level at which drugs are “cut” or diluted from upper-level 
dealers to low-level dealers. This decentralization in dilution might then lead to greater 
variation in purity. As a result of these varied responses to MMs, such laws may well 
have increased the variance of purity.9 On the other hand, it seems just as possible that 
the ADAA, by encouraging higher purities across the board, may lead to less variation in 
drug purity. Again using the STRIDE data, I find the introduction of federal MMs 
increased the standard deviation of cocaine purity by 6 percentage points (almost the 
same as the shift described above). In the heroin market, I find no effect from federal 
                                                
9 In addition, it is possible for an increase in theLemons Problem (Akerlof, 1970) after average purity rises 
since higher expected purity is correlated with higher prices and therefore a higher incentive to passoff 
low-quality product. It is worth noting that, as shown in Figures 4 and 5, this does not appear to be the case 
in my data since the density of low-purity observations falls after 1987. 
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MMs, although states with preexisting MMs had standard deviations for heroin purity 
that were 4.4 percentage points higher. Thus althoug  the effect varies between drugs, the 
evidence indicates that the ADAA did indeed increase the uncertainty of cocaine purity. 
 The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the existing literature on illicit drug markets. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 
contains the results regarding the effect of MMs on drug purity. Section 5 investigates the 
effect of purity changes on ER mentions and outcomes. S ction 6 estimates the impact of 
the ADAA on the standard deviation of purity. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Existing Literature 
 Over the past thirty years, the economic literature on illicit drug markets has had 
three main themes. First, a number of researchers have sought to model the demand for 
these substances. On the theory side, this has led to the rational addiction work pioneered 
by Stigler and Becker (1977) and continued by Spinnewyn (1981), Becker and Murphy 
(1988), Dockner and Feichtinger (1993), and others. This literature seeks to model the 
unique properties of addictive substances and create a u ility-based theory for why users 
begin use and display patterns such as escalating consumption. Recent theory has moved 
towards state-contingent utility theory, including Hung (2000) and Laibson (2001), and 
cue-conditioned cognition addiction models such as Bernheim and Rangel (2004). In 
these models, the forward thinking "rational addict" is replaced by a more myopic model 
of consumption. However, since user behavior can be mathematically modeled, this is 
still rational behavior. The empirical strand of this theme has focused on estimating the 
various factors that influence drug use. Chief among these is the attempt to capture the 
 9 
price elasticity of demand since interdiction efforts presumably lead to higher prices and 
therefore less use (more on this below). Because of data availability, most studies 
estimate the price sensitivity of cocaine (Grossman and Chaloupka, 1998) and heroin 
(Silverman and Spruill, 1977; Bretteville-Jensen and Sutton, 1996) or both (Saffer and 
Chaloupka, 1999).10 Bach and Lantos (1996) go a different route and estimate the effect 
of heroin prices on users' demand for methadone treatment. On the whole, this work finds 
that higher prices decrease demand, although the magnitude of the price elasticity varies.  
One study that is particularly important for the current issue is that of Caulkins 
and Padman (1993), who investigate cocaine users' willingness to substitute between 
purity and quantity. In particular, they find that this substitution is not perfect. Using the 
STRIDE drug price data, they find that consumers pay more for two grams of a 30 
percent pure drug than for one gram with 60 percent puri y. Thus, although drug markets 
might shift away from quantity towards purity due to MMs, Caulkins and Padman's 
results suggest that they would not switch to an entirely pure product. 
The second strand of the literature focuses on the impact of government policies, 
particularly those geared at reducing the drug supply. Generally, this is done by isolating 
the impact of a policy on drug prices. If higher prices reduce drug use, this is one method 
of capturing the effectiveness of policy. In a search model, Freeborn (2003) theoretically 
considers the price effects of enforcement, including MMs, on the cocaine market. 
However, she does not empirically test this effect. Kennedy, Reuter, and Riley (1994) 
build an extremely detailed model of the cocaine market in order to simulate the price 
effect of a variety of drug interdiction efforts, including defoliation policies in Columbia. 
                                                
10 Exceptions include Nisbit and Vakil's (1972) marijuana study and van Ours's (1995) work with early 
20th-century opium consumption data.  
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As with the price elasticity studies, due to data av il bility most of the empirical 
work estimating the effect of government policies ha  focused on the cocaine and heroin 
markets. Kuziemko and Levitt (2001), Bushway, Caulkins, and Reuter (2003), DiNardo 
(1993) and Lee (1993) find that increases in the sev rity of punishment or the level of law 
enforcement increase cocaine prices. Rydell and Sohler-Everingham (1994) estimate the 
cost-effectiveness of interdiction versus treatment programs finding that treatment is a 
more cost-effective method of reducing drug use. Caulkins, Rydell, Schwabe, and Chiesa 
(1997) perform a similar analysis for the effects of MM sentences on cocaine trafficking, 
again finding that treatment is more cost effective. 
 The third strand of the literature considers the eff ct of drug use on a variety of 
outcomes. Examples of this work includes the effect of drug use on educational 
attainment (Chatterji, 2003), marital stability (Kaestner, 1995), and violence (Fryer, 
Heaton, and Levitt, 2004). Closer to the current analysis are those studies that estimate 
the effect of drug prices, as a proxy for drug usage, on drug-related ER mentions. Early 
work by Caulkins (2001) finds that prices are negatively correlated with ER mentions. 
Hyatt and Rhodes (1995) include city fixed-effects and find a similar impact for cocaine 
prices. Dave (2004) criticizes these studies for not i cluding time trends and other 
correlates. After controlling for these, he too finds a negative correlation between price 
and ER mentions, both for cocaine and for heroin. Model (1993) finds a comparable 
negative correlation between marijuana prices and ER mentions of the drug. 
 It is important to note the crucial role that price data plays in most of the above 
empirical work. However, not all researchers agree with using STRIDE's price data for 
economic research. In particular, Horowitz (2001) argues that these data are not 
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representative of typical drug transactions due to sample selection. A clever rebuttal to 
this criticism is provided by Caulkins (1994), who n tes that if there is indeed a large, 
observable bias in the prices negotiated by law enforcement officers relative to actual 
users, this should act as a signal to the drug dealer. As such, Caulkins argues that the 
dealer would then likely walk away without the trans ction being completed, thereby 
excluding the observation from the sample. In any case, I do not use price data as my 
variable of interest.  
On a related note, there is the concern that the dealers themselves are a biased 
sample, a concern motivated by the possibility thatdealers targeted by the DEA are not 
representative of average dealers. In the context of this paper, if the DEA targets high-
purity dealers then the average purity might be higher here than in (unavailable) 
representative data. This indicates the need to control for unobserved factors by using 
state-specific fixed effects. However, when asking whether the federal MM increased 
purity in a differences-in-differences specification, to find the results I do it would be 
necessary for the DEA to change its priorities in amanner targeting even higher-purity 
dealers in states without their own MMs at around the same time the federal law took 
effect. Since there is no documentation to support such a claim, my results give the best 
indication of the effect of the federal law given the constraints of the available data. 
 
3. Data 
 The unit of observation in my data is a drug transaction. Specifically, I estimate 
the following specification: 
, , 0 1 2 , 3 4 , 5 6 , , ,i s t s s t i s t t s t i s tPurity S T X ManMin Z Yα α α α α α α ε= + + + + + + +  
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where , ,i s tPurity  is the purity of transaction i which took place in state s in year t. This is 
a function of state-specific fixed effects (sS ), state specific linear time trends (,s tT ), 
transaction specific variables (iX ), the legal environment in state s in year t ( ,s tManMin ), 
state-invariant time-varying variables (tZ ), other state-specific time-varying variables 
( ,s tY ), and the error term , ,i s tε . 
Information on a drug transaction comes from the DEA's STRIDE database, 
which contains information on cocaine and heroin arrests by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the DEA. For this study, I use data from 1977 to 2001 since 
information from ongoing investigations is withheld by the DEA (this is a problem in the 
data after 2001).1112 For each arrest, the date and location of the arrest is logged as well as 
the form, quantity, and purity of the drug seized.13 In my estimates I use powder cocaine 
and heroin. In addition to the above information, if the arrest followed a completed 
transaction, the STRIDE data reports the price negotiated for the given amount.14 
Observations with missing information were deleted. International observations were also 
deleted, thus my sample is composed of observations fr m the fifty U.S. states plus 
Washington D.C. (all of which I refer to as “states”).15 The handful of observations with 
                                                
11 My data were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, request number 02-0714-R. 
12 In unreported results, I used sub-samples of the data including the ten and four years surrounding 1987. 
This yielded similar sign patterns to the reported r sults, however significance declined along with the large 
decrease in the number of observations. 
13 A sizable number of observations report zero purity. If these observations are dropped, similar results are 
found with an estimated coefficient for federal mand tory minimums of 24.6 for cocaine and 8.7 for heroin, 
both of which are significant at the 1% level. 
14 This is the case for 98.7 percent of my cocaine observations and 98.9 percent of my heroin observations. 
In unreported results using all observations but omi ting price information, similar results are found. 
15 As noted below, I find no impact of U.S. mandatory minimums on the purity of cocaine or heroin in the
international data. This indicates that the change i  purity is indeed U.S. specific and is therefore unlikely 
the result of a change in world drug markets. 
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purities greater than 100 or quantities equal to zer were also deleted. This left 107,747 
cocaine observations and 37,972 heroin observations with price data.  
Four transaction-specific variables were used: two for prices and two for 
quantities. Prices were converted into real 2000 dollar values using the personal income 
price deflator from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Price, which is the real 
price per gram, is then used as a control variable.16 Since the impact of repeat 
transactions, market uncertainty, and other unobserved factors are likely to be correlated 
with the price, this variable controls for the influence of such items on purity. In addition, 
Total Price, the real price for the entire transaction was used. The rationale for including 
this is that large, valuable transactions are likely to be both riskier and resulting from 
repeated interaction, yielding potentially different ffects relative to low-cost transactions 
even if the price per gram is comparable. Similarly, Quantity and Quantity2 (the square of 
quantity), both measured in grams, control for the possibility that the retail and wholesale 
drug markets may have different average purities.17 The date of the arrest was used to 
construct eleven month dummies which were used in all specifications but are not 
reported in the tables.18  
 The legal environment variables are my variables of interest. In order to use a 
differences-in-differences approach, there are foursuch variables. The first is a dummy 
variable Federal MM which is equal to 1 for any observation in 1987 or later (the year 
                                                
16 Given the criticism of Horowitz (2001), if these prices are biased estimates of actual prices, then this may 
bias their estimated coefficient. However, since this is not my variable of interest, I am relatively 
unconcerned with this possibility. As a robustness check, I estimated a specification excluding price as a 
control. For both cocaine and heroin, the coefficient on mandatory minimums changed little in either 
magnitude or significance. For more discussion on the possible effects of sample selection in the data, see 
below. 
17 In unreported results, I used replaced the quantity variables with a set of discrete quantity groups. This 
had no qualitative and little quantitative impact on the results. 
18 December was the omitted month. Note that these month dummies net out the year-invariant average 
difference across months and thus do not preclude the use of the year-varying variables discussed below. 
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the law took effect) and zero otherwise. The second is a dummy variable Prior State MM 
equal to 1 for any observation occurring in a state wi h its own MM instituted prior to 
1987. The third interacts these two thereby providing the difference in the effect of the 
federal law between states with their own MMs by 1987 and those that did not. Since the 
introduction of the federal law would likely have a smaller impact in states with their 
own preexisting MMs, I anticipate a negative coefficient for the interaction of the prior 
state and federal variables. Note, however, that I do not necessarily expect it to have an 
equal but opposite coefficient from the federal variable. Since a drug dealer can be 
arrested and convicted by either federal or local authorities, it is still possible that the 
introduction of federal MMs on top of state MMs led to an increase in purity. The fourth 
variable, Post State MM is a dummy variable equal to one for any observation occurring 
in a state with its own MM enacted after the federal law took effect.19 Similar to the 
interaction term, I expect that the imposition of a st te MM on top of the federal one to 
have little effect on purity. 
These state-level MM variables were created from information collected through 
communication with state attorney general offices and l w enforcement offices. This was 
then corroborated against the tables listed in the Bur au of Justice Assistance (1996). It is 
important to note that these state MMs are not always limited to drug offences but that all 
do indeed apply to drug dealers. A well-known example of this is California’s “three 
strikes” law in which third time felony offenders face a MM.20 Thus, some states do not 
have MMs for the initial offense, but do for the second or third offense. In addition some 
                                                
19 Note that since all of these state laws are enacted no earlier than 1987, interacting this with Federal MM 
would yield the same variable. 
20 Some states also have mandatory minimums specific for violent offenders (repeat or not). Since this 
differs significantly from the federal law, I do not count this as a drug offense mandatory minimum. 
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states had MMs for more specific offenses such as selling drugs within 1,000 feet of a 
school or for dealers in possession of a handgun. Since these more specific types of laws 
do not correspond as well to the federal MMs as state ' repeat offender laws do, I do not 
count these. Therefore, the state MM variables indicate the existence of a law under 
which a repeat, non-violent drug trafficker would face a MM, making this measure of 
state laws as close a counterpart as possible to the federal law.21  
 In addition, I include a number of additional variables capturing federal and state-
specific law enforcement efforts. Access to detailed measurements of these variables is 
one of the primary reasons drug studies are typically limited to a short time frame or a 
narrow location. As an alternative, at the national level, I include three measures of 
activity by the DEA. Budget is the DEA's budget measured in real millions of 2000 
dollars. Agents is the number of special agents employed by the DEA.22 These data are 
available on the DEA's website.23 One possibility is that all of these are positively 
correlated with purity since they are positively relat d to the probability of arrest, giving 
dealers an incentive to further reduce quantity in favor of purity. Alternatively, with more 
agents, it may be that the DEA is able to target more mid- and low-level dealers, leading 
to a drop in the average purity. I also include the total number of observations for a given 
drug (Total Busts) in a given year as another proxy of overall effort and effectiveness of 
law enforcement. At the state level, I include the s are of a particular drug's observations 
                                                
21 While there is a great deal of variation across state  in terms of the number of offenses needed to trigger 
the mandatory minimum and the severity of the punishment it entails, the complexity and degree of 
heterogeneity makes it impossible to construct a meningful variable to exploit these details. Furthermo e, 
several states changed the severity of the sentence imposed and made other legal changes regarding the 
possibility of parole. Since I am unable to obtain detailed information on the dates of these revisions, I use 
this simple dummy variable approach. 
22 In unreported results, I also used the total staff of the DEA. This did not greatly impact the result of the 
variables of interest. However, because of the highcorrelation between this and Agents, it is omitted from 
the presented results. 
23 At the time of this writing, this was http://www.dea.gov. 
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in a given state in a given year (State Intensity). All else equal (including population), I 
expect that greater relative interdiction effort in a given location will increase its share of 
the total observations. Therefore I expect this too to be positively correlated with purity. 
Finally, as a measure of the overall crime level in a state, I include the FBI's Crime Index, 
which reports the number of crimes in a state-year p r 100,000 people. 
 As well as law enforcement measures, I include a number of state-level economic 
controls. Economic controls include real gross state product (GSP) and real per-capita 
personal income (Income), both from the BEA.24 I also include the percentage of the 
population below the poverty line from the Current Population Survey (Poverty Rate) and 
the unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Unemployment Rate). My 
expectations are that states with high incomes and strong economies will have consumers 
who demand a higher quality, i.e. a more pure, product. At the same time, however, states 
with large numbers of poor people may have more users who demand higher purity. 
 Finally, I include several demographic variables. Population, obtained from the 
BEA, controls for the population of a state. I include three measures of ethnicity: the 
percentage of blacks aged sixteen and over (% Black), the percentage of Hispanics aged 
sixteen and over (% Hispanic), and the percentage of other non-whites aged sixteen and 
over (% Other Nonwhite). Likewise, three age categories were included: % Aged 0-17, % 
Aged 18-24, and % Aged 25-66. These measure the percentage of the state's populati n 
falling into these age categories. Four education categories were included, one for high 
school graduates (% High School), one for some college (% Some College), one for four-
year college graduates (% College), and one for some post-graduate education (% Post-
                                                
24 These were converted into real 2000 dollars by respectively using the GDP and personal income price 
deflators from the BEA. 
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graduate). All of these measure the percent of the population for whom this is their 
maximum educational attainment. The percentage of the population that was male (% 
Male) and the percentage of single female-headed househlds (% Female Household) 
were also included. All of these demographic variables were obtained from the Current 
Population Survey. Although work cited in Section 2 does consider the impact of 
demographics on drug demand, this does not necessarily imply specific expectations for 
the signs of the demographic variables regarding dru purity. However, since I expect 
frequent drug users to demand a more pure product, I stereotypically expect higher 
purities in young, uneducated populations with large numbers of minorities and males. 
 Summary statistics for all of my data are found in Table A1 of the Data Appendix. 
 
4. The Impact of Mandatory Minimums on Purity 
 Table 4 reports OLS estimates of the impact of MMs.25 As discussed by Bertrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), potential serial correlation in errors can yield to false 
rejections of differences-in-differences estimates. Therefore, as they suggest, errors are 
clustered by state. The first two columns use the cocaine data and the second two use the 
heroin data. Columns 1 and 3 use the full sample, wh reas columns 2 and 4 use only 
those observations with quantities less than or equal to one gram. As noted by Horowitz, 
these amounts are more representative of retail transactions, thus this was done to get a 
measure of the potential impact at the "street level".26  
As Table 3 shows, in all four specifications, Federal MM is positive and highly 
significant. For the full sample of cocaine, the estimated coefficient is 25.8. When 
                                                
25 In addition to OLS, in unreported estimates I used Tobit due to the presence of purities equal to zer and 
100. These results were very similar to those report d.  
26 Using a total transaction price cutoff instead of a quantity cutoff yields similar results. 
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compared to the average purity of the sample of 62 percent, this implies about a 42 
percent increase in purity after the federal MMs took effect. Note that the magnitude of 
this change is roughly equal to the difference in the average purity just before the law 
took effect and its high point in 1991. In the “street-level” cocaine sample, the estimated 
impact is even greater at 30.1 percentage points. Compared to the purity average of 60.8 
in this sample, the federal MM increased the purity by about 50 percent. In the heroin 
data, the magnitude of the federal law’s impact is smaller: 8.6 percentage points in the 
full sample and 6.9 in the “street-level” sample. Given the average purities in these 
samples of 29.1 and 17.8, this translates to increases of 30 and 39 percent respectively. 
As predicted, estimated impact of the federal law is smaller in states that had their 
own preexisting MMs, although this difference is not significant for the street-level 
cocaine sample. For the full cocaine sample, this yields a rise from the federal law only 
about 2/3 the size of that in states without their own MMs. In the heroin data, F-tests 
indicate that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the federal law did not affect purity in 
states with their own MMs.  Furthermore, for states that enacted their own MMs after the 
federal law, purity does not significantly differ from states that never do so. The one 
exception is in the full cocaine sample, where averg  purity in these states is actually 
lower. As with the preexisting state MMs, this may reflect a smaller purity increase from 
the federal law.  
Looking at the estimated impact of the state-level MMs themselves, there is a 
noticeable difference between the cocaine and heroin data. In the cocaine sample, a 
preexisting state MM raises the purity (significantly so in the full sample), suggesting that 
state MMs shifted the market towards higher purities. In the heroin results, however, this 
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coefficient is negative, suggesting the opposite. As the sample statistics of Table 3 
indicate, when compared to states without their ownMMs, states with preexisting MMs 
had markedly higher heroin purities both before andfter 1987. Since many of the states 
with preexisting MMs instituted them either before r very early in the sample, it may be 
that the state-specific fixed effects are washing out much of the impact of these laws in 
the heroin data, leading to a spurious negative coeffi ient. In fact, in unreported results 
omitting state fixed effect, this coefficient becomes insignificant while the other MM 
variables retain the signs and significance of the reported results. 
Turning to the other controls, the coefficients on Quantity and Quantity2 indicate 
that purity is an increasing, concave function of the quantity of the deal. Agents and 
Budget are generally negative and significant whereas Crime Index and State Intensity 
generally positive and significant. These first two might indicate that when the DEA has 
greater manpower that it is able to target smaller dealers (arguing against the contention 
that Federal MM is capturing a push by the DEA to target high-purity dealers). This latter 
is consistent with the notion that high crime regions might attract greater law 
enforcement, increasing the incentive to shift towards higher purities. The state economic 
variables generally indicate that higher purities are found in smaller states with higher 
average incomes but higher incidences of poverty and unemployment. This suggests a 
possible impact of income inequality on drug markets, a potential subject for future 
research. Higher purities are also generally found in states with few males, few single 
female-headed households, greater percentages of min rities (especially Hispanics), and 
large numbers of teenagers. As for the education variables, greater numbers of graduates 
at any level is positively correlated with purity, although this is only significant in the full 
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sample suggesting that this is primarily due to a greater number of large transactions 
(which tend to be purer) in such states. 
It is important that comparable results for the federal MM variables are found in 
both the heroin and cocaine data. Since the time-variation in the purity of powder cocaine 
may be influenced by the rise of crack cocaine (which is by definition impure but more 
powerful), then one might be concerned that Fed MM is merely reflecting this shift in the 
cocaine market. This would be the case if crack attracted low-purity users, leaving only 
high purity, recreational cocaine users. However, it is unclear that the introduction of 
crack would also attract low-purity heroin users. In addition, one might just as well 
expect that hardcore users (those who demand higher purity) would be those most 
attracted to crack. Furthermore, this does not explain why these effects would differ by 
state according to pre-existing state-level MMs. Unfortunately, the STRIDE database 
does not provide information on crack and I am unaware of another indicator of crack use 
that varies by state and year. Thus, while it is posible that the magnitude of the F d MM 
variable is impacted by an omitted crack effect, it is unclear that the bias is necessarily 
positive or that the positive coefficient is entirely driven by this omission. 
 Thus, the data robustly indicate the existence of an effect of federal MMs on the 
purity of cocaine and heroin. As an additional check on the impact of MMs, I also 
utilized to the international data available in theSTRIDE database. There, I used these 
data to estimate the effect of U.S. federal MMs on the purity of drugs purchased by the 
DEA or the FBI in other drug importing countries (i.e. the OECD countries).27 Since the 
MMs are only effective for arrests within the United States, their introduction should 
                                                
27 The countries used were Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Finland, Italy, 
Korea, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.  
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have no effect on the purity of drugs in other countries. However, if the MM dummy is 
simply capturing an overall shift in drug markets towards higher purities, then it might 
well be significantly positive in these international data. As shown in Table 5, after 
controlling for Quantity, Quantity2, a common time trend, and country fixed effects, 
Federal MM is insignificant in the cocaine and significantly negative in the heroin 
regressions.28 This adds further evidence that this federal MM variable is capturing 
something other than a simple positive change in the trend of drug purity. In the next 
section, I explore one potential impact from this increase in purity. 
 
5. Purity and Emergency Room Episodes 
 While recognition of the effect of MMs on purity is interesting in its own right, it 
is worth asking what impacts this may have had. Oneeffect, as noted by the DEA (1999), 
is that readily available, highly-pure heroin is attr cting users unwilling to inject it. 
According the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (2004), 
between 1992 and 2003 the number of users inhaling heroin increased from 20 percent to 
33 percent while the number injecting it decreased from 77 percent to 62 percent. In 
addition, higher purities may make it more difficult to break addiction.  
 Another potential result from the shift in purity concerns the need for users to 
seek medical attention. As Figures 2 and 3 show, for the U.S. as a whole the number of 
emergency room episodes (ER mentions) that mentioned cocaine or heroin use rose 
markedly during the 1990s. 29 At the same time, the average purity of cocaine fell while 
                                                
28 Due to the scarcity of price information in these data, I exclude them as explanatory variables to boost 
sample size. 
29 Figures 2 and 3 use only observations of one gram or less to calculate the average and standard deviation 
of purity. 
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that of heroin rose (although both were significantly higher than they were before 1987). 
Thus, at least the heroin numbers might suggest that higher average purity levels increase 
ER mentions. This begs the question of why drug users do not simply reduce the amount 
that they consume as purities rise. One possibility, as discussed by Bernheim and Rangel 
(2004), is that they do not behave like forward-thinking rational economic agents, but 
enter a "hot state" in which they consume as high a quantity as possible. Nevertheless, 
one would imagine that such users would alter the quantity they keep on hand to adjust to 
changes in average purity. An alternative is that some other, uncontrolled-for factor has 
risen along with average purity and ER mentions.  
One such candidate is the variance in purity within a location during a given 
period of time. As Table 1 indicates, the MM for a repeat offender is twice that of a 
comparable first-time offender. As such, one would expect repeat offenders to shift more 
towards purity in response to the MM.30 In addition, variation in dealers' understanding of 
the law might lead to differing levels of response to MMs. Both of these would lead to 
heterogeneous purity changes in response to the ADAA. Added to this is the fact that 
some offenders are permitted to trade information for reduced sentences. Since access to 
information varies across dealers, their need to increase purity might as well. 
Furthermore, as more dealers are apprehended and become repeat offenders, these 
response differences may well grow over time. Finally, the ADAA may have led to a 
decentralization of the drug dilution process. All of these would contribute to 
heterogeneous dealer responses to the MMs. As a result, the rise in purity would vary 
across dealers, leading to potential increases in the variance of purity. As Figures 2 and 3 
                                                
30 Unfortunately, data on the offender is not available from the STRIDE database therefore I cannot 
examine how the response might vary with offender-specific characteristics.  
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show, the standard deviation of cocaine and heroin purity did indeed rise following the 
imposition of federal MMs. Figure 4 presents this information in a different way, 
illustrating histograms for the purity of observations under one kilo before and after 
federal MMs. For both cocaine and heroin, after 1987 there is a noticeable shift towards 
higher purities. Furthermore, there is a clear increase in the dispersion of purity. Thus, 
again the data indicate that the variance of purity rose following the introduction of 
federal MMs.31  
This greater uncertainty regarding purity may then lead to more accidental over-
consumption and more ER mentions even if users cut back on the quantity consumed due 
to higher average purity. As described by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (2004b), 
the wide variation in street-level heroin purity is a primary reason for heroin overdoses. 
Therefore, if agents are economically rational, it may not be the average purity that 
matters for ER mentions, but the standard deviation in purities. 
 To test this possibility, I utilize the DAWN's dataset on emergency room 
mentions for cocaine and heroin. This dataset reports the number of ER mentions per 
100,000 for the 21 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) listed in table A2 of the Data 
Appendix. The time period used is 1990 to 2001.32  These data were used by Caulkins 
(2001), Hyatt and Rhodes (1995), and Dave (2004) to es imate the effect of drug prices 
on mentions. Following these studies, I use a reduc form specification where the 
number of ER mentions for drug d in MSA m in year t is: 
, , 0 1 , , 2 , 3 , , 4 , ,.d m t d m t m t d m t t d m tER Avg price X PureVars Trendα α α α α ε= + + + + +  
                                                
31 Note that I am not claiming that mandatory minimums caused these changes. I address this possibility in 
Section 6. 
32 The response rate data were graciously provided by Dhaval Dave. Note that due to some missing 
observations, I am left with an unbalanced panel.  
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Where , ,. d m tAvg price  is the average price per pure gram of the drug, ,m tX  are other MSA-
specific controls, , ,d m tPureVars  is a vector of purity variables for the drug in question, 
tTrend  is a linear trend, and , ,d m tε  is the error term. As in the above studies, MSA 
controls include the percentage of an MSA's hospitals responding to the DAWN survey 
(Response Rate), a time trend, and real income of the MSA. 33 Unlike those studies, in 
some specifications I also control for the average purity, the standard deviation of purity, 
and the skewness of purity for a given MSA in a given year. The average price and the 
three purity variables were all constructed using observations with quantities less than 
one gram.34 Summary statistics for the data used in these regressions are in Table A3 of 
the Data Appendix. This specification is estimated s parately for cocaine and heroin. 
 Table 6 presents the results for total cocaine ER mentions. Column 1 presents a 
baseline specification that is comparable to the existing literature, including only the 
average price of cocaine, a trend, real income, and the response rate. As in earlier studies, 
I find a negative and significant coefficient for the average price. This would be 
consistent with higher prices reducing use and therefore the need for medical attention. 
Column 2 adds the average purity to this baseline specification. As can be seen, the 
average purity of cocaine appears to be negatively related to the number of ER mentions. 
However, as Column 3 shows, this is due to an omitted variable bias. Column 3 also adds 
the standard deviation and the skewness of cocaine purity. Of these, only the standard 
deviation is significant. Consistent with the above discussion, it is positive, suggesting 
                                                
33 In unreported results using the average actual price per gram (uncorrected for purity), comparable results 
were found for the distribution of purity coefficients. 
34 This differs from Dave (2004) who uses observations f 40 grams or less. I use this smaller amount due 
to Horowitz’s (2001) observation that most retail sle  involve smaller amounts of around one gram. Also, 
due to missing data for some MSA’s, rather than use Dave’s approach of substituting statewide data, I drop 
this MSA-year. If such replacements are made, similar results are obtained. 
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that greater uncertainty increases ER mentions. To give an idea of the magnitude of these 
changes, between 1986 and 1987, the standard deviation of cocaine purity rose by 4.4 
percentage points. This translates to 772 more cocaine ER mentions per 100,000. 
Comparing this to the sample mean, this is an increase of 15 percent. Note that when 
including the standard deviation of purity, the aver ge purity becomes insignificant while 
the average price retains its standard, significantly negative coefficient. 
 Column 4 modifies the above specification by adding the average price, the 
average purity, and the standard deviation of purity for heroin as explanatory variables 
for cocaine ER mentions. As in Column 3, the cocaine standard deviation is positive and 
significant. In addition, the standard deviation of heroin is positive and significant. This 
suggests three possibilities. First, greater uncertainty in the heroin market, all else equal, 
leads more consumers to use cocaine, increasing cocaine ER mentions. Second, it could 
be that the heroin standard deviation acts as another proxy for overall drug market 
uncertainty. Third, this might be the result of an increased risk from joint usage, leading 
to more ER mentions for either drug. Finally, Column 5 repeats the specification of 
Column 4 but also controls for MSA fixed effects. Here, the standard deviation of heroin 
purity is again positively correlated with cocaine ER mentions. 
 Table 7 undertakes a comparable set of regressions for heroin ER mentions. As in 
the cocaine results, I find the typical result that a higher average price is significantly 
related to fewer heroin ER mentions. Also like the cocaine data, I find a significant effect 
from the average heroin purity only when I omit thestandard deviation of heroin purity. 
The only robustly significant coefficient is that for the standard deviation of heroin 
purity. Using the estimated coefficient of 94.3, this suggests that the four percentage 
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point increase in the standard deviation of heroin purity following federal MMs would be 
associated with an increase in heroin ER mentions of 377 per 100,000 people. Relative to 
the mean in the sample, this is a 15.4 percent increase. This result is robust to the 
inclusion of MSA fixed effects, as shown in Column 5. Also noteworthy is that, at least 
when not using MSA fixed effects, the standard deviation of cocaine purity is also 
positively correlated with heroin ER mentions, which s again suggestive of risk 
substitution between drugs. 
 Finally, Table 8 uses additional data from the DAWN that describe the outcome 
of the ER mentions as well as the reason the patient sought help, assuming that these 
were known. These more detailed data are available only for 1995 to 2001.35 To my 
knowledge, these data have yet to be used by economists. I report the results for three 
items: deaths per 100,000, overdoses per 100,000, and the number of complaints of 
unexpected reaction per 100,000. All of these are used separately for cocaine and heroin 
mentions. In all specifications, in addition to theMSA controls used above I include the 
average price, the average purity, and the standard deviation of purity of the drug in 
question. Since cross-drug effects and skewness were rarely significant in these results, 
they are omitted from the reported results. When included, they did not greatly impact the 
reported coefficients. 
Across the specifications, higher prices are usually associated with fewer negative 
outcomes possibly due to less use. However this effect is never significant. The standard 
deviation of purity, on the other hand, is almost always positive and significant. Greater 
uncertainty over cocaine purity is significantly and positively correlated with all three 
                                                
35 When controlling for MSA fixed effects, coefficients from these specifications were rarely significant. 
This is likely due to the shorter time series for which these detailed outcomes are available. 
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outcomes. Given the change in standard deviation at the time of the ADAA, these 
estimates translate to around one more death, 57 more overdoses, and 145 more 
unexpected reactions per 100,000. Relative to the respective sample means, these 
correspond increases of 9 percent, 14.1 percent, and 13.1 percent. 
For heroin, neither the average nor the variance of heroin purity are significantly 
correlated with deaths. One potential explanation for this difference between heroin and 
cocaine deaths is that long-term cocaine users becom  more sensitive to the drug's 
anesthetic and convulsant effects which are linked to the primary causes of death from 
cocaine use (NIDA, 2004a). Heroin users, however, do not exhibit an increased 
probability of death after continued use.36 Like the cocaine results, however, the standard 
deviation of heroin purity is positively linked to both overdoses and unexpected 
reactions. Using the increase in standard deviation following the ADAA, these 
coefficients translate to 44 more overdoses and 30 more unexpected reactions per 
100,000. Again, compared to the sample means, theseimply increases of 9.6 percent and 
9.7 percent respectively. Finally, the only time that average purity is significant in Table 
8 is for unexpected reactions from heroin use. Here, it is negative and significant. This 
suggests that higher average purity seemingly reduces the number of unexpected heroin 
reactions, potentially due to fewer unexpected adulterating substances. As an indicator of 
the magnitude of this effect, the 12.8 percentage point increase in average heroin purity 
due to MMs would correspond to a drop in heroin unexpected reactions of 86 per 
100,000, a reduction of 28.1 percent relative to the sample mean. 
                                                
36 In conversations with emergency room medical staff, I was informed that their rule of thumb is that a 
death by heroin overdose is a suicide since it is so difficult to accidentally die of a heroin overdose. 
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Taken together, these results suggest that higher average purities of cocaine and 
heroin are not associated with a rise in emergency room mentions, but that increased 
variance may well be. Thus, if MMs did indeed lead to higher average purities and higher 
variances around that mean, then yet another unintended effect of the ADAA of 1986 
may have been to increase the number of health emergencies associated with drug use. In 
particular, since many drug users are likely uninsured, this poses a substantial cost to the 
general public. According to the Robert Wood Johnson F undation (2001), nearly 20% of 
all Medicaid hospital costs and nearly 25% of its inpatient care costs are the result of 
substance abuse. To give an idea about the magnitude of this cost, according to Nordlund, 
Mancuso, and Felver (2004), the average cost of an ER visit from a drug overdose in 
Washington state during 2002 was $1,456. Using the numbers from Tables 6 and 7, 
where the change between 1986 and 1987 implies 1149 more ER mentions from cocaine 
or heroin per 100,000, for Seattle’s MSA population of 2.4 million, this would translate 
into a cost of just over $40 million per year for tha  city alone. These costs are in addition 
to the other health and productivity losses resulting from drug use, costs which the Office 
of National Drug Control Policy (2001) put at $161 billion in 2000. 
 
6. The Impact of Mandatory Minimums on the Standard Deviation of Purity 
 While the data does show that the standard deviation of cocaine and heroin purity 
rose following the introduction of federal MMs, this does not guarantee a significant link 
between the two. Furthermore, given the discussion above, the ADAA may well have had 
conflicting effects on the standard deviation of purity. As such, the net effect is uncertain 
and must be determined empirically. Therefore in ths section I employ a methodology 
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similar to that used in Section 4 to ask whether such a significant link exists and whether 
its magnitude differs between states that had theirown MMs and those that did not. 
To do this, I use the STRIDE data described in Section 3 to construct the standard 
deviation of purity in a state within a given year. When there was only one observation 
for a given drug in a given state-year, this observation was dropped. Consistent with the 
approach in Section 5, I construct this measure using only those observations where the 
quantity is less than or equal to one gram. In addition to the standard deviation of purity, 
five other variables were constructed: the average purity, the skewness of purity, the 
average price per gram, the average price per transaction, and the average quantity per 
transaction. The other controls used are the same as those in Tables 2 and 3. Note that 
these include state fixed effects and state-specific time trends.37 Again, errors are 
clustered by state. 
The results from these regressions appear in Table 9, where Column 1 reports the 
cocaine estimates and Column 2 reports the heroin estimates. As Column 1 shows, the 
estimated impact of federal MMs on the standard deviation of cocaine purity is 6 
percentage points with no significant difference between states with their own MMs and 
those without. Given the estimates from Column 4 ofTable 6, this suggests that in a state 
without its own MM, the ADAA would be associated with a 28 percent rise in cocaine 
ER mentions. Turning to the heroin results, the estimates suggest that federal MMs had 
no effect. However, the institution of a state MM prior to 1987 it increased the standard 
deviation by 4.4 percentage points. Using the estimates from Column 4 of Table 7, a 
preexisting state MM would be associated with a 21 percent rise in heroin ER mentions 
in these states. Unfortunately, I do not have data on ER mentions from the period 
                                                
37 Because of the switch to annual, state-level observations I am unable to use month dummies. 
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surrounding the ADAA to compare to these predictions to the actual change. 
Nevertheless, these estimates suggest that the ADAA may well have impacted the health 
consequences of drug use even if drug users respond to anticipated changes in purity. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The goals of this paper have been threefold. First, it estimated the impact of 
federal MM sentences that are based on gross quantity o  the purity of cocaine and 
heroin. For a variety of specifications, the data indicates that there was a significant rise 
in drug purity following the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Unlike many studies on illegal drug 
markets, my goal has not been to estimate the effect o  this policy on the price of drugs or 
on usage. Caulkins, Rydell, Schwabe, and Chiesa (1997) perform such an analysis and 
find that a million dollars spent on federal MM sentences yields a reduction in cocaine 
consumption of less than 40 kilos (compared to the 100 plus kilo reduction from equal 
spending on treatment of heavy users). One of the primary reasons I did not take the 
typical approach is that, since prices are not the key variable, my estimates are insulated 
from the criticism of Horowitz (2001) regarding the prices negotiated by DEA agents. 
Second, in addition to documenting the effect of MMs, I consider how average purity and 
the distribution of purity affect emergency room episodes. In particular, I find that the 
standard deviation of purity seems to be a primary determinant of negative health 
consequences, including total emergency room visits, overdoses, and death. Third, I find 
that the introduction of federal MMs played a role in the uncertainty over cocaine purity, 
providing a link between the ADAA and drug-related emergency room episodes. 
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 In closing, it is worth considering what policy implications can be drawn from 
these results. With regards to heroin, higher purities appear to have increased in the 
number of heroin users because of the decreased need to inject the drug. In addition, the 
purity of heroin rose with no change in the standard deviation. This suggests a reduction 
in the likelihood of an unexpected reaction from use. Combined, these results suggest that 
federal MMs may increase heroin use by reducing some f its negative consequences 
(although this may be offset by some state laws). At the same time, however, the stiffer 
penalties likely increased the price and thereby reduc  consumption. For cocaine, the 
reductions in consumption due to price increases ar bolstered by a rise in the standard 
deviation of purity and the associated increase in the risk of negative health effects. Thus, 
if the government's objective is to reduce the number of users, the net effectiveness of 
such laws is uncertain. Alternatively, if the goal is to reduce the risk borne by addicts, 
sentencing structures that do not induce heterogeneous producer responses may reduce 
emergency room mentions. 
 One final point is to note that this paper focuses on the impact of federal MMs. 
Beyond this policy, there are a variety of federal and local enforcement measures that I 
do not directly consider.  In addition, I only consider the cocaine and heroin markets. 
Finally, it is likely that purity changes have impacted other outcomes from drug use 
besides emergency room mentions. Given the large exp nditures on interdiction, 
incarceration, and dealing with the impacts of drug use, these topics clearly warrant 
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Table 1. Federal Mandatory Drug Sentences for First-time Offenders 
 




Powder Cocaine 500 grams 5 years 10 years 
 5 kilos 10 years 20 years 
    
Crack Cocaine 5 grams 5 years 10 years 
 50 grams 10 years 20 years 
    
Heroin 100 grams 5 years 10 years 
 1 kilo 10 years 20 years 
    
LSD 1 gram 5 years 10 years 
 10 grams 10 years 20 years 
    
Marijuana 100 plants or 100 kilos 5 years 10 years 
 1000 plants or 1000 kilos 10 years 20 years 
    
Methamphetamine 5 grams 5 years 10 years 
 50 grams 10 years 20 years 
    
PCP 10 grams 5 years 10 years 
 100 grams 10 years 20 years 
 




Table 2: State Mandatory Minimums for Repeat Drug Offenders 
 
Alabama 1977  Nebraska 1977 
Alaska 1982  Nevada 1971 
Arizona 1978  New Hampshire 1969 
Arkansas 1971  New Jersey 1987 
California 1977  New Mexico ---- 
Colorado 1992  New York 1973 
Connecticut ----  North Carolina 1994 
Delaware 1987  North Dakota 1993 
Florida 1973  Ohio 1996 
Georgia 1994  Oklahoma 1982 
Hawaii 1976  Oregon ---- 
Idaho 1990  Pennsylvania 1988 
Illinois 2004  Rhode Island 1988 
Indiana 1976  South Carolina 1976 
Iowa 1979  South Dakota 1989 
Kansas ----  Tennessee 1989 
Kentucky ----  Texas 1974 
Louisiana ----  Utah ---- 
Maine 1988  Vermont ---- 
Maryland 2002  Virginia 1992 
Massachusetts 1987  Washington ---- 
Michigan 1978  Washington, D. C. ---- 
Minnesota 1989  West Virginia 1971 
Mississippi 1977  Wisconsin ---- 
Missouri 1989  Wyoming 1982 





Table 3: Average Purities for Observations Under 1 Gram 
 
 Cocaine Heroin 
 Prior to 
1987 
After 1987 Prior to 
1987 
After 1987 
State mandatory minimum 
instituted prior to 1987 
26.9 36.0 14.3 27.9 
No state mandatory 
minimum 
22.9 53.2 6.5 19.0 
State mandatory minimum 
instituted after 1987 
 33.5  36.5 
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Table 4: Effect of Mandatory Minimums on Purity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cocaine Heroin 
 All 
Quantities 
≤ 1 Gram All Quantities ≤ 1 Gram 
Federal MMM  25.766*** 30.147*** 8.555*** 6.931*** 
 (7.98) (7.01) (3.24) (2.65) 
Prior State MM  9.134*** 12.154 -6.144*** -7.283*** 
    (2.84) (1.32) (3.27) (4.04) 
Prior State MM -7.153* -7.929 -7.212** -8.070** 
   *Federal MM (1.83) (0.77) (2.38) (2.05) 
Post State MM -4.831** -0.407 4.831 8.098 
    
 
Other controls: 
(2.06) (0.09) (1.49) (1.31) 
Price 3.6e-5 -0.001* 2.5e-4*** 8.7e-5 
 (1.54) (1.69) (4.36) (0.36) 
Total Price -1.0e-10* 0.003 -1.1e-7*** 2.4e-4 
 (1.73) (1.57) (3.84) (0.53) 
Quantity 6.6e-5 74.921*** 0.011*** 48.569*** 
 (1.22) (3.41) (5.44) (3.56) 
Quantity2 -1.0e-12 -56.691*** -1.3e-7*** -32.860*** 
 (0.02) (4.60) (4.02) (3.05) 
Agents -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (5.11) (2.66) (3.52) (2.87) 
Budget -0.005 -0.016*** -0.006** 3.2e-5 
 (1.02) (2.82) (2.22) (0.01) 
Crime Index 1.3e-5 1.9e-5* 1.1e-5** 1.2e-5** 
 (1.27) (1.75) (2.05) (2.47) 
Total Busts 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001 -0.009*** 
 (2.63) (6.33) (0.29) (3.33) 
State Intensity 39.221* 25.981 5.465 37.014** 
 (1.92) (1.09) (0.29) (2.16) 
Population -6.3e-6 -7.7e-6 -2.4e-6 -6.2e-6** 
 (1.12) (1.00) (0.89) (2.18) 
GSP -9.0e-5*** -1.2e-4** -7.9e-6 2.2e-5 
 (3.61) (2.44) (0.26) (0.76) 
Income 0.002*** 0.001 0.002** 0.001 
 (2.71) (1.29) (2.38) (0.78) 
Poverty Rate 0.750** -0.484 -0.025 -0.139 
 (2.25) (1.17) (0.11) (0.46) 
Unemployment Rate 0.040 0.084 0.842** 1.136** 
 (0.11) (0.17) (2.32) (2.47) 
% Male -1.993*** -2.015*** 0.533 0.846 
 (3.16) (3.44) (1.00) (1.50) 
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% Female H-hold -0.919*** -0.956** -0.250 -0.304* 
 (4.32) (2.34) (1.16) (1.66) 
% Hispanic 0.914** 2.194*** 1.040** 1.447** 
 (2.06) (3.09) (1.99) (2.09) 
% Black -0.220 -0.632 0.278 0.611* 
 (0.51) (1.07) (0.92) (1.88) 
% Other Nonwhite 0.280 0.880 1.015* 1.390** 
 (0.67) (0.82) (1.87) (1.96) 
% Aged 0-17 1.901*** 1.823** 0.607 -0.727 
 (4.86) (2.10) (0.92) (1.12) 
% Aged 18-24 0.809 0.254 -1.539* -1.918* 
 (1.12) (0.25) (1.85) (1.89) 
% Aged 25-66 1.726*** 1.148* -0.190 -0.110 
 (3.58) (1.70) (0.35) (0.12) 
% High School 1.462*** 0.907 1.037** -0.023 
 (2.64) (1.08) (2.29) (0.04) 
% Some College 1.173** 0.474 1.614*** 0.829 
 (2.26) (0.58) (3.68) (1.36) 
% College 1.156** 0.773 2.411*** 1.263** 
 (2.05) (0.93) (6.35) (2.02) 
% Post-graduate 1.474* 1.300 1.481* 0.315 
 (1.85) (1.12) (1.81) (0.36) 
Constant -34.156 44.423 -95.544 -3.026 
 (0.60) (0.50) (1.44) (0.04) 
     
Observations 107747 24406 37972 15207 
R-squared 0.17 0.25 0.43 0.42 
     
H0: Federal MM + 
Prior State MM* Fed. 
MM = 0 
28.7*** 5.53** .35 .17 
H0: Prior State MM = 
Post State MM  
13.22*** 1.43 7.55*** 4.65** 
 
All specifications include state-specific quadratic trends, month dummies, and state fixed 
effects. T-statistics in parentheses. Errors are core ted for clustering on states. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: U.S. Mandatory Minimums and International Observations 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Cocaine Heroin 
Federal MM -1.258 -17.223*** 
 (0.66) (7.21) 
Quantity 0.000 0.000*** 
 (1.02) (4.74) 
Quantity2 -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (1.04) (4.30) 
Trend 0.001 0.445*** 
 (0.01) (2.66) 
Constant 78.250 -828.943** 
 (0.23) (2.50) 
   
Observations 1071 1744 
R-squared 0.07 0.08 
 
All specifications include country fixed effects. T-statistics in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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 Table 6: Total Cocaine Emergency Room Mentions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Avg. Cocaine Price -0.348*** -0.377*** -0.204** 0.010 0.018 
 (4.07) (3.93) (2.20) (0.11) (0.25) 
Avg. Cocaine Purity  -26.260* 16.621 45.491 31.109 
  (1.66) (0.41) (0.79) (1.41) 
Std. Dev. of  Cocaine Purity   175.463*** 244.245*** 32.915 
   (3.22) (3.55) (1.43) 
Skewness of Cocaine Purity   634.310 779.909 560.803 
   (0.89) (0.77) (1.50) 
Avg. Heroin Price    70.754 9.054 
    (0.94) (0.34) 
Avg. Heroin Purity    -34.733 -3.496 
    (1.10) (0.22) 
Std. Dev. of Heroin Purity    191.029*** 25.637* 
Other controls: 
   (3.82) (1.76) 
Trend -38.361 -67.928 76.198 -160.876 370.996*** 
 (0.30) (0.52) (0.60) (1.09) (3.12) 
Real Income 0.141* 0.155* 0.170* 0.408*** -0.254 
 (1.83) (1.90) (1.81) (3.63) (1.48) 
Response Rate 3.475 7.950 0.699 -9.139 -31.985 
 (0.10) (0.21) (0.02) (0.24) (0.87) 
Constant 77,255 136,502 -158,886 300,720 -727,304*** 
 (0.31) (0.53) (0.63) (1.03) (3.10) 
      
Observations 166 166 166 136 136 
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.35 0.93 
     MSA Fixed Effects 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Total Heroin Emergency Room Mentions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Average Heroin Price -0.029** -0.027* -0.039** -0.024 -0.004 
 (2.03) (1.97) (2.40) (1.15) (0.21) 
Average Heroin Purity  17.307* 0.357 -3.529 -6.997 
  (1.72) (0.03) (0.20) (0.61) 
Std. Dev. of  Heroin Purity   94.302*** 117.687*** 22.841** 
   (5.00) (4.84) (2.24) 
Skewness of Heroin Purity   166.404 289.077 66.490 
   (0.80) (0.97) (0.30) 
Avg. Cocaine Price    149.571 65.107 
    (1.40) (1.50) 
Avg. Cocaine Purity    6.271 8.057 
    (0.57) (1.17) 
Std. Dev. of Cocaine Purity    114.147*** 18.809 
Other controls: 
   (4.44) (1.50) 
Trend -31.162 -50.089 -84.214 -21.454 308.886** 
 (0.65) (0.96) (1.61) (0.31) (2.33) 
Real Income 0.290*** 0.294*** 0.260*** 0.296*** -0.167 
 (7.24) (7.42) (6.50) (5.73) (0.86) 
Response Rate 11.307 8.770 6.660 -19.208 -11.179 
 (0.64) (0.49) (0.37) (0.86) (0.35) 
Constant 55,053 92,381 159,818 31,049 -608,958** 
 (0.58) (0.89) (1.54) (0.22) (2.34) 
      
Observations 179 179 174 136 136 
R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.35 0.48 0.89 
     MSA Fixed Effects 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 43 
Table 8: Effect of purity distribution on detailed outcomes 
 
 Cocaine Heroin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Death Overdose Unexpected 
Reaction 
Death Overdose Unexpected 
Reaction 
Average Price -0.003 -0.323 -1.301 -0.001 -0.020 0.044 
 (0.27) (0.60) (0.76) (0.79) (0.64) (0.54) 
Average Purity -0.026 -3.193 -8.403 -0.036 0.518 -6.752** 
 (0.59) (1.20) (1.20) (0.52) (0.29) (2.17) 
Std. Dev. of Purity 0.191** 13.007** 32.997* 0.129 10.957*** 7.507** 
Other controls: 
(2.38) (2.25) (1.90) (1.45) (3.53) (2.36) 
Trend -0.767 -22.575 17.548 -0.121 -20.169 6.049 
 (1.36) (0.68) (0.20) (0.15) (0.89) (0.17) 
Real Income 0.000 0.017 0.037 0.000 0.046*** 0.023*** 
 (0.56) (1.65) (1.53) (1.55) (6.77) (3.09) 
Response Rate 0.039 -9.462* -20.605 0.081 -0.044 -1.190 
 (0.41) (1.66) (1.22) (0.73) (0.01) (0.21) 
Constant 1,528.750 45,708.514 -34,045.887 231.467 39,01 .520 -12,415.977 
 (1.36) (0.70) (0.19) (0.15) (0.87) (0.18) 
       
Observations 76 99 99 79 97 96 
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.40 0.12 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 9: The Effect of Mandatory Minimums on the Standard Deviation of Purity 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Cocaine Heroin 
Federal MM  5.915*** -2.127 
 (4.15) (1.23) 
Prior State MM 3.805 4.437** 
    (1.29) (2.48) 
Prior State MM -0.736 0.629 
   *Federal MM (0.40) (0.21) 
Post State MM -0.501 -2.741 




Avg. Purity -0.139 0.395*** 
 (1.27) (4.12) 
Skew of Purity -5.734*** 2.255*** 
 (3.24) (4.13) 
Avg. Price -0.002 0.002*** 
 (1.51) (5.26) 
Avg. Total Price 0.002 -0.002* 
 (1.63) (1.77) 
Avg. Quantity 1.254 -1.044 
 (0.11) (0.09) 
Avg. Quantity2 -23.201 -8.640 
 (1.38) (0.69) 
Agents -0.005*** -0.004** 
 (3.09) (2.16) 
Budget 0.003 0.002 
 (0.89) (0.73) 
Crime Index 0.000 0.000 
 (1.56) (1.33) 
Total Busts 0.002*** -0.003* 
 (3.69) (1.73) 
State Intensity -32.916*** -8.798 
 (2.96) (0.63) 
Population -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.54) (0.75) 
GSP -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.54) (0.04) 
Income 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.30) (0.42) 
Poverty Rate 0.136 -0.130 
 (1.17) (0.57) 
Unemployment Rate -0.066 0.377 
 (0.28) (1.01) 
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% Male -0.586* 0.202 
 (1.76) (0.41) 
% Female Household -0.017 0.077 
 (0.13) (0.43) 
% Hispanic -0.420* 0.164 
 (1.86) (0.47) 
% Black 0.130 -0.113 
 (0.57) (0.38) 
% Other Nonwhite 0.071 0.491 
 (0.28) (1.61) 
% Aged 0-17 -0.180 0.241 
 (0.52) (0.47) 
% Aged 18-24 0.072 0.650 
 (0.13) (1.11) 
% Aged 25-66 0.209 0.758* 
 (0.58) (1.94) 
% High School 0.099 0.000 
 (0.33) (0.00) 
% Some College -0.361 -0.281 
 (1.32) (0.57) 
% College -0.306 -0.105 
 (1.14) (0.24) 
% Post-graduate -0.302 0.193 
 (0.78) (0.30) 
Constant 97.810** -38.021 
 (2.14) (0.79) 
   
Observations 829 655 
R-squared 0.56 0.71 
   
H0: Prior State MM After 




All specifications include state-specific time trends and state fixed effects. T-statistics in 
parentheses. Errors are corrected for clustering on states. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A1: Summary Statistics for Mandatory Minimum Data 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Source 
Cocaine 
Quantity 107747 88.08726 5190.252 .0001 1079470 STRIDE 
Purity 107747 62.63515 25.05883 0 100 STRIDE 
Total Price 107747 2041.234 32457.96 0 6988654 STRIDE 
Total Busts 107747 1233.978 1594.143 1 7213 STRIDE 
State Intensity 107747 .0762997 .0934419 .0000576 .3628664 STRIDE 
Heroin 
Total Busts 107747 334.138 426.1965 0 2056 STRIDE 
Quantity 37972 25.86766 323.0952 .0001 50010 STRIDE 
Purity 37972 29.09451 28.433 0 100 STRIDE 
Total Price 37972 3081.696 17716.4 0 2393647 STRIDE 
State Intensity 107747 .0767003 .095416 0 .4488623 STRIDE 
State Controls 
Population 107747 7492379 7405307 397363 3.45e+07 BEA 
GSP 107747 231872.2 240208.8 7865.195 1330025 BEA 
Income 107747 26274.85 5330.126 13587.31 41530.2 BEA 
Staff 107747 6968.145 1584.127 4013 9209 DEA 
Agents 107747 3484.903 829.0652 1896 4601 DEA 
Budget 107747 1054.613 381.8441 371.2285 1658.006 DEA 
% Hispanic 107747 7.699618 8.180856 0 38.93061 CPS 
% Black 107747 20.6977 20.26783 0 73.07587 CPS 
% Aged 0-17 107747 25.74821 2.771935 14.35 39.13191 CPS 
% Aged 18-24 107747 10.37813 1.576349 5.636529 17.36039 CPS 
% Aged 25-66 107747 53.52478 2.505309 41.26107 61.75636 CPS 
% Male 107747 48.43827 1.158322 43.67656 53.28239 CPS 
%Female Hhold 107747 39.27622 8.657475 12.76664 59.65788 CPS 
% High School 107747 58.54255 4.612187 35.56177 73.50031 CPS 
%Some College 107747 34.03636 5.462852 14.12591 50.3051 CPS 
% College 107747 13.06181 6.929686 1.564506 33.93786 CPS 
% Post-grad. 107747 6.592497 3.156708 1.564506 16.62609 CPS 
Poverty Rate 107747 13.66706 4.106874 2.566354 29.11244 CPS 
Unemp. Rate 107747 5.943443 1.802266 2.2 18 BLS 
Crime Index 107747 477647.3 463931 15683 2061761 FBI 
Post State MM 107747 .3882335 .4873505 0 1 Author 
Prior State MM 107747 .183374 .3869746 0 1 Author 
Federal MM 107747 .8166353 .3869671 0 1 Author 




Table A2: MSAs Used for Overdose results 
Atlanta Baltimore Boston Buffalo 
Chicago Dallas Denver Detroit 
La Miami Minneapolis/St. Paul New Orleans 
New York Newark Philadelphia Phoenix 
St. Louis San Diego San Francisco Seattle 
Washington DC    
 
Table A3: Summary Statistics for Overdose Data 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
Cocaine 
Avg. Price 166 436.05 1702.4 0 14721.71 STRIDE 
Avg. Purity 170 39.03681 18.72741 2.195122 84.66666 STRIDE 
Std. Dev. 
Purity 
170 34.3787 7.936098 2.516612 50.80682 STRIDE 
Skewness of 
Purity 
170 .2724356 1.221376 -3.370676 6.166441 STRIDE 
Total 
Mentions 
170 5156.074 4842.143 468.3386 21592.34 DAWN 
Deaths 70 7.128571 6.875543 0 29 DAWN 
Unexpected 
Reactions 
91 1109.659 1278.486 94 5158 DAWN 
Overdoses 91 638.9341 461.0733 43 1792 DAWN 
Heroin 
Avg. Price 179 1782 5600 23 49988 STRIDE 
Avg. Purity 176 28.85146 14.78393 1.044444 77.75 STRIDE 
Std. Dev. 
Purity 
176 24.2998 10.56431 .7071068 47.83584 STRIDE 
Skewness of 
Purity 
176 .5002679 .9303404 -2.399548 2.992001 STRIDE 
Total 
Mentions 
176 2452.808 2708.598 53.17404 11332.14 DAWN 
Deaths 74 8.540541 8.802536 0 37 DAWN 
Unexpected 
Reactions 
91 308.1209 445.6308 3 2578 DAWN 




170 80.37882 9.173884 44.4 100 DAWN 
Real Income 170 30398.33 6005.932 20472.13 58702 Census 
 
Sources: 
STRIDE: System to Retrieve Drug Evidence. 
DAWN: Drug Abuse Warning Network (http://dawninfo.samhsa.gov). 
BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov). 
CPS: Current Population Survey (http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/cpsmain.htm). 
Census: US Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov). 
DEA: Drug Enforcement Agency (http://www.dea.gov). 
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation (http://www.fbi gov). 
BJA: Bureau of Justice Assistance (1996). 
